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THE QUIET OF DISSOLUTION:  
POST-DISASTER REDEVELOPMENT  
AND STATUS-PRESERVING COMPENSATION 
David V. Simunovich∗
To add to the gloom, almost every living thing seems to have departed, and not 
a whistle of a bird nor the bark of the squirrel can be heard in this solitude. 
Sometimes a morose gar will throw his tail aloft and disappear in the river, but 
beyond this everything is quiet—the quiet of dissolution.  Down the river floats 
now a neatly whitewashed hen-house, then a cluster of neatly split fence-rails, 
or a door and a bloated carcass, solemnly guarded by a pair of buzzards, the 
only bird to be seen, which feast on the carcass as it bears them along.  A 
picture-frame in which there was a cheap lithograph of a soldier on horseback, 
as it floated on told of some hearth invaded by the water and despoiled of this 
ornament.1
Mark Twain, 1882 
INTRODUCTION 
Though written more than a century ago, Twain’s account of the 
devastation wrought by that unnamed storm conveys a scene of utter 
ruin and hopelessness—a scene repeated all too frequently in the 
wake of major disasters.  More recently, Hurricane Katrina, the costli-
est2 and third deadliest3 hurricane in American history, caused a 
 ∗ J.D., anticipated May 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; 2005, M.S.T., 
Pace University Graduate School of Education; 2002, B.A., summa cum laude, Political 
Science, University of California, Los Angeles.  Many thanks to my parents, my 
brother, and Ami Doshi, for their continued love and support.  Additionally, I owe a 
debt of gratitude to Professors Rachel Godsil and Shavar Jeffries for their guidance 
and advice throughout my legal education. 
 1 Mark Twain, Voyage of the Times-Democrat’s Relief Boat Through the Inundated, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES DEMOCRAT, Mar. 29, 1882, available at http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu 
.au/words/authors/T/TwainMark/prose/lifeonmississippi/appendixa.html. 
 2 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HIGH WATER MARK COLLECTION FOR HURRICANE 
KATRINA IN ALABAMA 6 (2006). 
 3 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, SUMMARY REPORT ON BUILDING PERFORMANCE: 
HURRICANE KATRINA 2005, at 1–5 (2006) [hereinafter FEMA, BUILDING 
PERFORMANCE]. 
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sense of stillness and quietude reminiscent of Twain’s description of 
the storm-ravaged Gulf Coast.  However, despite Katrina’s devasta-
tion, disaster recovery itself need not be wholly disruptive to Gulf 
Coast communities.4  Post-disaster redevelopment provides residents, 
policy makers, and community agents with the potential to “imple-
ment technologies and practices which afford a stronger and more 
sustainable future.”5  This Comment explains one method of facilitat-
ing the transition from the quiet of dissolution to the boom of effec-
tive, efficient, and equitable redevelopment.6
Hurricane Katrina was “gargantuan in size,” measuring 460 miles 
in diameter7 and registering wind speeds up to 175 miles per hour.8  
The intensity of the storm surge forced the Mississippi River to tem-
porarily flow backwards,9 flooded 148 square miles of urban land-
scape,10 and elevated the water level in one lake more than eleven 
feet in nine hours.11  Katrina spread more than twenty-four million 
tons of debris over the Louisiana landscape, submerged 350,000 
automobiles, and damaged more than 60,000 vessels.12  To date, 
more than fifty-nine billion federal dollars have been committed to 
post-Katrina redevelopment.13  Most troubling, the storm took the 
lives of approximately 1500 individuals.14
 4 Operation Fresh Start Recovery Assistance Programs, http://www.freshstart 
.ncat.org/assist.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
 5 Id. 
 6 While this Comment focuses on Hurricane Katrina’s effect on the Gulf Coast, 
the material facts and statutory framework is relevant to any post-disaster redevelop-
ment process. 
 7 DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, 
AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 132 (2006). 
 8 Id. at 221. 
 9 Id. at xiii. 
 10 IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE STORM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA—THE INSIDE STORY FROM ONE LOUISIANA SCIENTIST 109 
(2006). 
 11 Elizabeth Kolbert, Watermark: Can Southern Louisiana Be Saved?, NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 27, 2006, at 54. 
 12 LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, 2006 QUARTERLY REPORT: JUNE–AUGUST 11 
(2006), available at http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/quarterlyreport/LRAQuar 
terlyReportAugust2006_update.pdf [hereinafter LRA, JUNE–AUG. QUARTERLY 
REPORT]. 
 13 Id. at 12. 
 14 Charles C. Mann, The Long, Strange Resurrection of New Orleans, FORTUNE, Aug. 
21, 2006, at  86.  The precise number of hurricane-related deaths is not entirely clear.  
See, e.g., LRA, JUNE–AUG. QUARTERLY REPORT 2 (referring to Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita as “taking nearly 1,500 lives”); FEMA, BUILDING PERFORMANCE, supra note 3, at 1–
5 (citing death toll of approximately 1,300). 
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One of the neighborhoods most devastated by Katrina was the 
Lower Ninth Ward.15  This neighborhood of 14,000 residents16 sits, in 
some places, four feet below sea level and was flooded by eighteen 
feet of water when the levees failed.17  The levee breach produced 
“truly catastrophic results,”18 and sent forth a wall of water that de-
molished homes in its immediate vicinity, caused extensive flooding 
in others, and ultimately took the lives of hundreds in less than two 
hours.19
While approximately ninety-eight percent of Lower Ninth resi-
dents were African American,20 Katrina’s destructive capacity did not 
discriminate.  “In the [Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes], 
people of color represented 52% of the pre-Katrina population and 
53% of the dead . . . . [T]he storm flooded 51% of the white-
occupied homes and 67% of the black-occupied homes in the three-
parish area . . . .”21  While the storm destroyed without regard to race 
and wealth, the burden of redevelopment will fall particularly hard 
on the poor, which include most Lower Ninth residents.22
The lasting effects of Katrina are fundamentally different than 
the more transient consequences that follow minor flooding or wind 
damage.  Researchers analogized Katrina’s effects to the nuclear dis-
aster at Chernobyl23 and called for “pioneering thinking” in restoring 
the Gulf Coast.24  Without such pioneering thinking—or, at a mini-
mum, strong and sustained leadership—redevelopment is bound to 
stumble along in an inefficient and inequitable manner.  For exam-
ple, in the absence of a program that encouraged efficient redevel-
opment, the city was plagued by “jack-o-lantern neighborhoods,” 
where “residents are scattered among abandoned houses” through-
out the city limits.25  This population pattern creates a severe strain 
on public services and infrastructure at a time when city services, as a 
 15 See Dan Baum, The Lost Year: Behind the Failure to Rebuild, NEW YORKER, Aug. 21, 
2006, at 46. 
 16 Id. 
 17 VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 84. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Baum, supra note 15, at 46. 
 21 Mann, supra note 14, at 96. 
 22 See id.; see also infra notes 181–87 and accompanying text. 
 23 JAMES P. KAHAN ET AL., FROM FLOOD CONTROL TO INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE GULF COAST FROM FLOODING IN OTHER PLACES IN THE 
LAST SIXTY YEARS 39 (2006). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Mann, supra note 14, at 96. 
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result of high rates of unemployment and severely reduced popula-
tion, can least afford such demands.26
In response to the devastation, local,27 state,28 and federal29 offi-
cials attempted to deliver some sense of normalcy to the hurricane’s 
victims by proposing or implementing various policies.  One product 
of these efforts is the Road Home, a program designed and imple-
mented by state lawmakers, but funded and approved by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development.30  The Road Home 
provides qualified Louisiana residents with grants of up to $150,000 
for uncompensated storm-related damage to their homes.31  The plan 
provides grants for home renovation and also permits qualified 
homeowners to sell property to the state at a pre-disaster fair market 
value.32  Homeowners also retain the right to sell property privately 
on the open market.33  This federally funded program “represents the 
largest single housing recovery program in U.S. history.”34
 26 Michele Krupa, Recovery Reports to Hasten Federal Cash Flow, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans), Oct. 21, 2006, at 1.  Krupa notes that Congress allocated more than 
$10 billion to the state of Louisiana in recovery aid, yet the bulk of that money is 
earmarked for the state’s housing crisis.  Id.  This leaves approximately $645 million 
dollars for parishes to redevelop critical infrastructure, $200 million of which was 
awarded to assist Entergy, a major employer and provider of public utilities, leaving 
$445 million to be divided among eleven storm-damaged parishes.  Id. 
     This lack of funding for critical infrastructure development will likely place 
greater pressure on city planners to reduce the city’s footprint, i.e., concentrate re-
development in limited areas, thereby maximizing the impact of reduced infrastruc-
ture redevelopment.  This, in turn, may place greater pressure on the city to imple-
ment the buyout-only provision of the Road Home program.  The criteria for this 
funding restriction are left unarticulated.  A major concern is that this funding 
shortage will increase the pressure on Road Home administrators to cast a wider net 
on the areas in which homeowners will not have the opportunity to benefit from 
Road Home renovation funding. 
 27 See, e.g., Gary Rivlin, Storm and Crisis: Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at A11 
(describing commission created by New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin). 
 28 See, e.g., Katrina Recovery Panel Announced, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2005, at A11 
(describing creation of the Louisiana Recovery Authority by Governor Kathleen 
Babineaux Blanco). 
 29 See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, $29 Billion Package Buoys Hopes for Rebuilding Effort, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A11 (describing Congressman Richard Baker’s proposed 
multi-billion-dollar recovery program). 
 30 LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, 2006 QUARTERLY REPORT: FEBRUARY–MAY 13–
14 (2006), available at http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/quarterlyreport/LRAQuarterly 
Report060606pdf.pdf [hereinafter LRA, FEB.–MAY QUARTERLY REPORT]. 
 31 Id. 
 32 LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, THE ROAD HOME OVERVIEW 8 (2006), available 
at http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/RoadHomecomplete053006.pdf [hereinafter 
LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 LRA, JUNE–AUG. QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 12, at 9. 
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The Road Home offers maximum financial assistance to home-
owners who choose to rebuild or relocate within Louisiana.35  If 
homeowners resided in a Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA)-designated floodplain before the storm made landfall but 
did not carry insurance,36 or if they elect to move outside of the state 
rather than rebuild in their communities,37 they may receive Road 
Home assistance, but not the full $150,000 grant.38   
The basic contours of the Road Home are largely commendable.  
It provides much-needed support to protect the homeowner status of 
Katrina-displacees and at the same time provides program adminis-
trators the flexibility to concentrate redevelopment in order to 
maximize the impact of a scarce resource—federal financial support.  
Yet the program remains fundamentally flawed.  It unnecessarily cre-
ates a cloud of confusion around the benefits and restrictions rele-
vant to Louisiana’s most vulnerable homeowners. 
A critical provision buried within the administrative innards of 
the Road Home holds that residents living in areas “where a high 
proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest” in their homes 
may not be eligible for the $150,000 rehabilitation grants.39  Rather, 
such homeowners may sell their homes to the state at a pre-flood fair 
market value, sell on the open market, or finance the renovations 
themselves.40  Compounding the problem, program administrators 
never articulated the standards to be used in identifying which 
neighborhoods, if any, would be subject to the funding restriction.41
 35 LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 6. 
 36 Id. at 12.  “[A] 30% penalty applies to those who failed to purchase insurance 
for their homes.  A penalty applies to those without flood insurance in a designated 
flood plain and those without hazard insurance that were outside the flood plain.”  
Id. 
 37 Id. at  9.  If a homeowner chooses to sell her home to the state, the homeowner 
will receive sixty percent of the property’s pre-storm fair market value.  Id. 
 38 Id. at 9, 12. 
 39 LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, THE ROAD HOME HOUSING PROGRAMS ACTION 
PLAN AMENDMENT FOR DISASTER RECOVERY FUNDS 6–7 (2006), available at 
http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/roadhome/HousingActionPlanAmendment050
306.pdf [hereinafter LRA, ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT]. 
 40 Id. at 7. 
 41 Id.  To date, program administrators have not expressly implemented the pro-
vision.  However, regardless of whether the buyout restriction is ultimately imple-
mented, the provision’s pernicious effects were felt in the months immediately fol-
lowing the storm, when residents made relocation decisions.  Without clearly 
articulated standards, the ambiguity of who would receive benefits—aside from how 
much a resident would receive—would have invariably deterred residents who lacked 
the financial ability to self-finance a major home renovation (precisely the home-
owners who would benefit most from government assistance).  See infra Part III.C.2. 
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The Road Home’s buyout-only restriction is, in the abstract, a 
reasonable and legitimate provision in light of the fact that the popu-
lation of New Orleans dwindled to 190,000 one year after the storm,42 
less than half of its pre-storm population of 455,000.43  Notwithstand-
ing the reasonableness of the provision in the abstract, the practical 
effect of the restriction works an inequitable harm on displaced resi-
dents targeted by the program’s efforts to constrict the city’s size, or 
its “footprint.”  While the initial and perhaps most critical post-
Katrina redevelopment planning has passed, this issue must be con-
fronted as natural disasters will inevitably affect communities across 
America,44 and redevelopment plans will invariably follow.  Plans simi-
lar to the Road Home may be common in the future, as it combines 
flexibility and discretion at the administrative level with a concern for 
the homeowner status of displacees at the beneficiary level.45
This Comment asserts that Katrina-displaced homeowners are 
eligible for benefits beyond the buyout-only provisions of the Road 
Home under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs 
(URA).46  As noted above, the buyout-only provision limits a home-
owner’s options to self-financed renovation, open market sale, or a 
state buyout at a pre-storm fair market value.47  The first two options 
 42 James Varney, Resident Count Comes in Low, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 
6, 2006, at 1. 
 43 Mann, supra note 14, at 94. 
 44 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 12 (2007).  The Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) issued a report on February 3, 2007, described as “a collabora-
tion of hundreds of scientists and government officials, [that] was approved by 113 
nations, including the United States.”  Angela Charlton & Seth Borenstein, 46 Na-
tions Back Body to Protect Planet, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2007, available at http:// 
www.breitbart.com/news/2007/02/04/D8N2QEGG0.html.  The IPCC noted both a 
trend toward stronger storm systems in the last three decades, and a likelihood that 
future storm systems will grow less frequent but more severe.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra, at 6--12. 
 45 It should also be noted that the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Prop-
erty Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs (URA) is best 
equipped to avoid repetitive losses, “[o]ne of the most serious consequences of the 
National Flood Insurance Program.”  RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, DISASTER AND DEMOC-
RACY: THE POLITICS OF EXTREME NATURAL EVENTS 31 (1999).  As of 1999, two percent 
of insured properties consumed “over one-quarter of all [National Flood Insurance 
Program] claims . . . [and forty] percent of all [National Flood Insurance Program] 
payments.”  Id. at 31–32.  Compensation under the URA largely avoids this problem 
as it permits government officials to reduce exposure to repetitive losses, while pro-
viding homeowners with a guarantee of comparable replacement housing.  See infra 
Part II. 
 46 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2000). 
 47 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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do not present affected low-income homeowners with reasonable al-
ternatives.  The third option is the only realistic choice that affected 
low-income homeowners will have if program administrators, using 
whatever metric they ultimately decide upon, designate an area as 
buyout only.  Moreover, homeowners who relocated in the wake of 
the storm because of the ambiguity surrounding Road Home benefits 
and reestablished families, employment, and affordable housing in 
other areas around the country will face the same pressure to sell 
property to the state under the buyback provision.  Though the buy-
back provision does not amount to a Fifth Amendment taking, the 
involuntariness of the transaction nevertheless triggers URA dis-
placement benefits. 
Part I of this Comment discusses Katrina’s impact on New Or-
leans generally, and the Ninth Ward particularly, as well as factors in-
dicating that natural disasters will continue to plague the Gulf Coast.  
Part II explains the statutory protections extended to displaced  
persons under the URA.  Part III explores three theories that advo-
cates can utilize to ensure the application of status-preserving com-
pensation under the URA to homeowners displaced by the Road 
Home. 
I. GULF COAST SUSCEPTIBILITY TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
Much has been made of the sheer strength and size of Katrina. 
However, by the time it made landfall in Louisiana, it was a relatively 
pedestrian meteorological event.48  The more profound and lasting 
issue is the Gulf Coast’s vulnerability to even medium-sized hurri-
canes, caused by a confluence of disappearing wetlands, subsiding 
land, and an inadequate levee system.  This convergence of factors 
led some scientists to characterize the Louisiana coastal region as 
“the very definition of an inherently vulnerable landscape.”49
The Louisiana coastline is distinguished by its vast network of 
swamps and marshes, which account for a large portion of America’s 
 48 VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 85 (noting that Hurricane Katrina’s 
winds were reduced to ninety-eight miles per hour—a Category Two storm—on land-
fall).  Van Heerden and Bryan note that, 
[a]s Katrina should have affected New Orleans proper, she was decid-
edly a medium hurricane.  Sometime in the foreseeable future a bigger 
storm will not take that last-minute jog to the east and every square foot 
of New Orleans—all of it, not just 80 percent [as was the case with 
Katrina]—will be underwater, and deeper underwater than this time. 
Id. at 10. 
 49 Id. at 4. 
SIMUNOVICH_FINAL 1/14/2008  9:01:25 AM 
338 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:331 
 
wetlands.50  In the past, the wetlands provided a crucial buffer be-
tween Louisiana coastal communities and Gulf storm systems.51  How-
ever, in the last several decades, these protective wetlands disap-
peared at an alarming rate.52
In addition to the disappearing wetlands, a recent study indi-
cates that New Orleans and its levees are sinking into the Mississippi 
River, with a period of drastic subsidence between the years 2002 and 
2005.53  Currently, most of New Orleans is about five feet below sea 
level,54 and the city is subsiding at a rate of one inch per year.55  This 
rate of subsidence may seem trivial, but some levees are now three 
feet lower than originally planned, substantially reducing the protec-
tion they were intended to provide.56  Explaining the protections os-
tensibly provided by the levees, one oil company executive noted that 
“[i]n the offshore [oil] business . . . , we design major structures 
in the Gulf for a 100-year wave height.  Because that height is an 
estimate, engineers add a safety factor of four to six for manned 
structures—that is, they build the structure to withstand a wave 
that is four to six times as high as the theoretical maximum.” . . . 
By contrast, . . . the safety factor of New Orleans is 1.3.  Surprised 
by this low standard, [researchers] traced it back to the 1940’s 
when the [Army Corps of Engineers] used a 1.3 safety factor to 
protect agricultural land—cows in other words—against flood-
ing.57
While a safety factor of 1.3 may seem woefully inadequate to protect 
human life, when the levees were originally designed and con-
 50 Id. at 153. 
 51 Mann, supra note 14, at 109; see also David Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal 
Resource Management: A Pragmatic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 625–26 
(1983) (providing a concise review of the benefits of viable wetlands). 
 52 BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 9.  One journalist recounted the variety of compara-
tive measurements used to convey the rate at which land is being lost on the Louisi-
ana coastline: “The region . . . is losing land at the rate of a football field every thirty 
eight minutes.  Alternatively, it is said, the area is shrinking by a large desktop’s 
worth of ground every second, or a tennis court’s worth every thirteen seconds, or 
twenty-five square miles a year.”  Kolbert, supra note 11, at 48.  One estimate indicates 
that an additional seven hundred square miles of coastal marshland will be lost by 
2050.”  BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 9. 
 53 Timothy H. Dixon et al., Space Geodesy: Subsidence and Flooding in New Orleans, 
NATURE, May 31, 2006, at 587. 
 54 VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 73. 
 55 Kolbert, supra note 11, at 49. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Mann, supra note 14, at 109. 
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structed, 100 miles of marshes served as an effective buffer between 
residential zones and Gulf storm systems.58
In addition to the post-Katrina exodus of more than half the 
city’s residents,59 New Orleans was suffering from a decades-long 
population decline.60  The city’s footprint was more appropriate for 
its pre-1960s population of more than 600,000.61  Population decline 
is relevant to post-disaster recovery efforts because it is difficult, if not 
fiscally implausible, for a “city shorn of much of its tax base”62 to con-
tinue to provide effective and efficient public services to residents on 
a pre-storm population pattern.63
The dramatic pace of coastal erosion and land subsidence indi-
cate that the Louisiana coastal region will continue to be susceptible 
to the devastating effects of even medium-sized hurricanes.  This 
need not deter redevelopment, but it should be kept in mind as pol-
icy makers at the city, state, and federal levels respond to Katrina’s 
lasting effects and plan to mitigate the damage sustained in future 
storm systems.64
II. URA DISPLACEMENT BENEFITS 
The express purpose of the URA is to establish “a uniform policy 
for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced” by pro-
grams funded with federal dollars, so that displaced persons do not 
“suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for 
the benefit of the public as a whole.”65  The objective of the URA is to 
ensure “fair, uniform, and equitable treatment” of any person dis-
placed as a direct result of a federally assisted land acquisition.66  Fur-
thermore, the URA calls for consideration of “the unique circum-
stances” of displaced persons so that “persons in essentially similar 
 58 Id. 
 59 Varney, supra note 42.  Nearly two years after the storm, some estimated the 
New Orleans population was sixty-two percent of its pre-Katrina level.  Adam Nos-
siter, Largely Alone, Pioneers Reclaim New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at 1.  How-
ever, individual population patterns in individual neighborhoods vary significantly.  
Id. 
 60 Baum, supra note 15, at 46. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Mann, supra note 14, at 96. 
 64 Redevelopment efforts may not be faithfully following a redevelopment plan 
that seeks to mitigate the effect of future storm systems.  See Peter Whoriskey, New 
Orleans Repeats Mistakes as It Rebuilds, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at A1. 
 65 42 U.S.C. § 4621(b) (2000). 
 66 Id. § 4621(a)(2). 
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situations are accorded equal treatment” in administering URA bene-
fits.67  The URA attempts to ensure that property owners whose 
homes are acquired by a qualified state agency “receive the replace-
ment value—rather than the market value—of their property.”68
The URA regulations provide for three tranches of benefits.  
Benefits enumerated in Subpart B are triggered if property is con-
veyed involuntarily.69   Subpart B benefits include, inter alia, a home-
owner’s right to an expeditious acquisition of his property,70 advance 
notice of an agency’s intent to acquire property,71 offers of “just com-
pensation,”72 and certain litigation expenses.73  The benefits enumer-
ated in Subparts D and E are triggered if the property owner is con-
sidered a “displaced person.”74  Subpart E provides that an owner-
occupant displaced by a qualified state agency75 may receive a pay-
ment of up to $22,500 to acquire replacement housing.76  The re-
placement housing must be “a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling . . . 
reasonably accessible to public services and places of employment,”77 
functionally equivalent to the acquired property,78 adequate in size to 
accommodate the occupants,79 in an area that is “not subject to un-
reasonable environmental conditions,”80 and within the financial 
 67 Id. § 4621(c)(2). 
 68 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 101, 121 (2006). 
 69 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a), (b) (2006).   
 70 Id. § 24.102(a). 
 71 Id. § 24.102(b). 
 72 Id. § 24.102(d)–(g). 
 73 § 24.107. 
 74 § 24.202 (describing applicability of Subpart C to “displaced persons”); § 
24.301 (describing applicability of Subpart D moving expenses to “displaced per-
sons”). 
 75 § 24.2(a)(1)(iv) (2006).  “The term State Agency means any department, 
Agency or instrumentality of a State or of a political subdivision of a State, any de-
partment, Agency, or instrumentality, of two or more States or of two or more politi-
cal subdivisions of a State or States, and any person who has the authority to acquire 
land by eminent domain.”  Id. 
 76 42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1); see also 49 C.F.R. § 24.401. 
 77 § 4623(a)(1)(A). 
 78 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(6)(ii).  Functional equivalency “means that it performs the 
same function, and provides the same utility. . . .  [T]he principle features [of the 
displacement dwelling] must be present.  Generally, functional equivalency is an ob-
jective standard, reflecting the range of purposes for which the various physical fea-
tures of a dwelling may be used.”  Id. 
 79 Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(iii). 
 80 Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(iv). 
SIMUNOVICH_FINAL 1/14/2008  9:01:25 AM 
2008] COMMENT 341 
 
means of the displaced person.81  Additionally, under Subpart E, ac-
quiring agencies are permitted to provide financial assistance beyond 
the statutory maximum on a case-by-case basis if the $22,500 amount 
proves inadequate for the acquisition of comparable replacement 
housing.82  Under Subpart D, displaced homeowners are also entitled 
to compensation for actual moving expenses,83 mortgage and closing 
costs,84 security deposits and credit checks,85 living expenses between 
the taking and acquisition of replacement housing,86 and litigation 
expenses if the government unsuccessfully attempts to acquire a par-
ticular piece of property through condemnation proceedings.87  
While the URA provides significant financial assistance to displaced 
homeowners,88 it also preserves a modicum of flexibility for city plan-
ners.  For example, the comparable replacement dwelling is not re-
quired to be in the same neighborhood as the acquired property,89 
and the replacement dwelling need not contain “every feature of the 
displacement dwelling.”90
As noted above, Subparts D and E are triggered if a property 
owner is considered to be a “displaced person.”  The statutory and 
regulatory definitions of “displaced person” have proven to be fluid 
concepts.  As originally envisioned in 1971, a displaced person was 
 81 Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(viii).  Replacement housing is “considered to be within the 
homeowner’s financial means if the homeowner will receive the full price differential 
. . . , all increased mortgage interest costs . . . and all incidental expenses . . . .”  Id. § 
24.2(a)(6)(viii)(A).  Similar provisions qualify the affordability of replacement hous-
ing for displaced renters.  Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(viii)(B). 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 4626(a); see also 49 C.F.R. § 24.404 (2006).  Evidence suggests su-
per-compensation, i.e., compensation above the statutory maximum, is not unheard 
of, and may be used both to ensure replacement housing as well as to overcome 
popular disapproval of takings projects.  Garnett, supra note 68, at 122–23. 
 83 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1). 
 84 Id.  Also, businesses are entitled to reestablishment compensation.  § 4622(c).  
Renters also receive significant protection under the URA, and may receive, among 
other things, up to sixty times the amount of the difference between their pre-
displacement and post-displacement rental costs.  24 C.F.R. § 42.350(e)(1) (2006); 
see also Garnett, supra note 68, at 122–23. 
 85 24 C.F.R. § 42.350(c). 
 86 Id. § 42.350(d). 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a). 
 88 This Comment does not argue that displacement assistance will fully compen-
sate homeowners who lose their home to a state agency.  Indeed, full compensation 
for state acquisition of property from an unwilling seller may be impossible.  See gen-
erally Rachel Godsil & David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership Society, in 
PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND EMINENT DOMAIN (Robin Paul 
Malloy ed., forthcoming 2008). 
 89 Mejia v. HUD, 518 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 90 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for 
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8945 (Mar. 2, 1989).  
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defined broadly as “any person who . . . moves from real property . . . 
as a result of the acquisition of such property” by a federally funded 
program.91  In passing the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 
1987 (“1987 Amendments”), Congress refined the conceptual frame-
work of a displaced person to include a “direct result” element.92  
Consequently, only those residents displaced from their property as a 
“direct result . . . of the acquisition of such property” by a federally 
funded program would be considered statutorily protected displaced 
persons.93
The 1987 Amendments also incorporated a provision to further 
clarify the scope and application of the URA by noting who was not a 
displaced person.94  These negative definitions expressly preclude a 
resident who unlawfully occupies a home from enjoying URA dis-
placement benefits.95  Additionally, individuals who reside on the 
property for the purpose of obtaining URA benefits,96 as well as short-
term renters whose period of tenancy expires before the property is 
needed by the acquiring agency, are similarly precluded from enjoy-
ing URA benefits as they are “persons not displaced.”97
Following the change in statutory language, the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHA) revised the URA regulatory framework in 
1989.98  These regulations expounded upon the displaced person 
standard and incorporated the direct result element for the acquisi-
tion,99 rehabilitation, or demolition of real property.100  Additionally, 
a non-exclusive listing of persons not displaced was included.101  
 91 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Fed-
eral and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
 92 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Fed-
eral and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I) (1988). 
 93 Id. 
 94 § 4601(6)(B). 
 95 § 4601(6)(B)(i). 
 96 Id. 
 97 § 4601(6)(B)(ii). 
 98 The Department of Transportation was given the responsibility of promulgat-
ing regulations for the implementation of the URA, and the Secretary of Transporta-
tion delegated that responsibility to the Federal Highway Administration.  Uniform 
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for Federal and 
Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8912 (Mar. 2, 1989).  These regula-
tions apply to “acquisition and displacement activities of 18 Federal Agencies.”  Uni-
form Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-
Assisted Programs,  70 Fed. Reg. 590, 590 (Jan. 4, 2005). 
 99 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(g)(1)(i) (1989). 
 100 Id. § 24.2(g)(1)(ii). 
 101 Id. § 24.2(g)(2). 
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These regulations were consistent with the statutory changes made by 
the 1987 Amendments.102
The revised regulations preclude mandatory benefits under 
Subpart B if an “owner-occupant . . . voluntarily conveys his or her 
property, as described in § 24.101(a)(1) and (2).”103  Section 
24.101(a)(1) describes a voluntary conveyance as one in which “no 
specific site or property needs to be acquired,”104 the property in 
question “is not part of an intended, planned, or designated project 
area,”105 and it will not be acquired if the owner-occupant and the ac-
quiring agency fail to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.106  The 
acquiring agency must also relate to the owner “what it believes to be 
the fair market value of the property.”107  For a transaction to be con-
sidered “voluntary,” each of the four criteria must be satisfied.108  In 
addition, section 24.101(a)(2) provides that displacement benefits 
are not to be extended if the acquiring agency is not vested with the 
authority to exercise eminent domain.109  This facially unequivocal 
language could be interpreted to preclude a cause of action for dis-
placement benefits for Katrina-displacees because the Road Home is 
not vested with the power of eminent domain.   
Before proceeding, it is important to reinforce the fact that the 
voluntariness of a certain transaction governs Subpart B benefits 
only.110  Benefits under Subparts D and E are triggered only if the 
homeowner is a “displaced person” under the URA.111  There is, with-
out doubt, a large degree of overlap between the triggering events; 
but the standards are nevertheless different.  Katrina displacees 
should be considered “displaced persons” if they moved as a “direct 
 102 Compare § 24.2(g)(2) with Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 
4601(6)(A) (1988). 
 103 § 24.2(g)(2)(viii). 
 104 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(i). 
 105 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(ii). 
 106 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(iii). 
 107 Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(iv). 
 108 Id. § 24.101(a)(1). 
 109 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a)(2) (1989).  Subpart B benefits will not be extended un-
der this provision so long as the acquiring agency “clearly advise[s] the owner that it 
is unable to acquire the property” through eminent domain proceedings should the 
parties fail to come to an agreement.  Id. § 24.101(a)(2)(i).  Additionally, the owner 
must be informed as to what the acquiring agency believes is the “fair market value of 
the property.”  Id. § 24.101(a)(2)(ii). 
 110 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 111 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(a) (2006); Id. § 24.401(a).  
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result of . . . the acquisition” of their homes by the Road Home.112  As 
explained in Part III, homeowners who relocated because of Katrina 
will be protected under a theory of constructive occupancy.113  Their 
displacement was prolonged by the Road Home,114 and once their 
property is formally acquired by the program, the displaced home-
owners will be eligible for benefits under Subparts D and E. 
Three arguments can be made to rebut the apparent prerequi-
site for eminent domain power to trigger Subpart B benefits.  First, 
section 24.101, while facially unequivocal, is in reality more nuanced 
and reflects the underlying regulatory and legislative framework 
within which displacement arises.115  Second, section 24.101 is without 
the weight of law because it impermissibly narrows the scope and ap-
plication of the URA.  Third, the buyout-only provision amounts to 
an involuntary conveyance of property under the URA, thereby satis-
fying even the narrowest interpretation of the scope of section 24.101 
under a theory of “functional takings.” 
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY UNDER THE URA 
A. The Regulations are More Nuanced Than Their Facially 
Unequivocal Language 
That the Road Home is not vested with the power of eminent 
domain does not preclude Katrina-displacees from successfully pursu-
ing Subpart B benefits, despite the ostensibly unambiguous language 
of section 24.101.  As noted above, section 24.101(a)(2) expressly 
precludes URA benefits if the acquiring agency does not have the 
power of eminent domain.116  However, in explicating the scope of 
section 24.101, the FHA noted that “[e]minent domain authority is 
not a determining factor by itself.”117  Moreover, the 1987 Amend-
ments were described as expanding the scope of the URA “to include 
any private entity that has the power of eminent domain under Fed-
 112 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I).   
 113 See infra Part III.C.1. 
 114 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 115 This inquiry, of course, assumes that property acquired by the Road Home 
would fulfill each of the four tests contemplated by § 24.101(a)(1)(i–iv).  However, it 
is likely that Road Home acquisitions would fail the second test, as acquired property 
would likely considered part of an “intended, planned, or designated project area.”  
§ 24.101(a)(1)(ii).   
 116 Id. § 24.101(b)(2). 
 117 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for 
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8918 (Mar. 2, 1989). 
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eral or state law.”118  The use of federal dollars to finance property 
acquisition—not the eminent domain power—“is the basic determi-
nant for [URA] applicability.”119  Moreover, section 24.101 is moti-
vated by an administrative intent to differentiate between voluntary, 
arm’s-length transactions between government-buyers and  
homeowner-sellers,120 and federally funded involuntary convey-
ances.121  Moreover, the URA’s preference for substance over 
form(and the emphasis on involuntariness, rather than the presence 
or absence of eminent domain authority) was recognized by the FHA 
itself when it noted that “[t]he essence of a voluntary transaction is 
the conditions surrounding the transaction, not the type of transac-
tion itself.”122
Considering the statutory and administrative intent, it is appar-
ent that the regulations are more nuanced than they initially appear.  
Understood in its proper context, the reference to eminent domain 
power is nothing more than a useful short-hand approach—but ulti-
mately not a dispositive element—in assessing whether an acquiring 
agency must provide Subpart B benefits. 
The FHA revised the URA regulations in 2005, and it is only with 
the proper understanding of the 1987 Amendments and their corre-
sponding regulations that the more recent regulations can be placed 
in appropriate context and accorded the correct interpretation.  No-
tably, the 2005 revisions amended the regulatory framework in the 
absence of any change to the relevant statutory language of the 
URA.123
The definition of displaced person, redesignated in 2005 as sec-
tion 24.2(a)(9), remained substantively equivalent to its 1989 coun-
terpart.124  The definition of persons not displaced is also left largely, 
 118 Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 18768, 18769 (May 
19, 1987). 
 119 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for 
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. at 8918.  The Federal Register 
goes on to explain that “any acquisition made under the threat of eminent domain is 
clearly subject to [the URA].”  Id. 
 120 The government-buyer includes qualified state agencies, which encompasses 
agencies created by the state as well as individuals vested with the power of eminent 
domain.  49 C.F.R. § 24.3(a)(1)(iv) (2006). 
 121 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and 
Federally-Assisted Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 590, 596 (Jan. 4, 2005). 
 122 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulation for 
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 47994, 48011 (Dec. 17, 1987).   
 123 Compare 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601–4655 (2003 & Supp. 2007) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4601–4655 (1988). 
 124 Compare 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(9)(i) (2005) with 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(g)(1)(i) (1989). 
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but not entirely, unchanged.125  Most relevant for purposes of this 
Comment, the 2005 regulatory definition of displaced person omit-
ted reference to “voluntary” conveyances as defined in section 
24.101.126  In the 1989 regulations, the definition of “persons not dis-
placed” included an “owner-occupant who voluntarily convey[s] his 
or her property” to the acquiring agency as described in section 
24.101.127  However, the 2005 revisions omit the “voluntary” lan-
guage—providing instead that displacement benefits should not be 
extended to “[a]n owner-occupant who conveys his or her property” 
to the acquiring agency in a transaction described in section 
24.101.128  The purpose of omitting the “voluntary” language in the 
2005 revisions is not explained in the Federal Register.129  The omis-
sion appears to reflect a change in section 24.101, which in its 2005 
manifestation does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
direct acquisitions by federal programs130 (as opposed to state programs 
funded by federal dollars).  URA applicability to federally funded 
state programs, as described in section 24.101(b), remains exactly the 
same as the corresponding 1989 regulations.131  As a result, acquisi-
tions made by the Road Home—a federally funded state program—
would still be evaluated by the voluntariness principle.132
Despite the facially unequivocal language of the regulation, 
eminent domain power is only indicative, and not dispositive, of a 
URA triggering event.  The statutory language and the regulatory 
framework pertaining to federally financed state acquisitions re-
mained virtually unchanged in the 2005 regulatory revisions.  As a re-
sult, the goal of providing equitable treatment to displaced home-
owners who involuntarily convey property to an acquiring agency 
remains the linchpin Subpart B benefits.  Consequently, Katrina-
 125 One substantial change is the preclusion of URA benefits for “[a] person who 
is not lawfully present in the United States.”  49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(9)(ii)(L) (2005). 
 126 Id. § 24.2(a)(9)(ii)(H). 
 127 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(g)(2)(viii) (1989). 
 128 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(9)(ii)(H) (2005). 
 129 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and 
Federally-Assisted Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 590, 590–606 (Jan. 4, 2005). 
 130 § 24.101(a)(1).  Even this facially unequivocal language is tempered by Ap-
pendix A, which states that, despite the language of section 24.101, direct federal ac-
quisitions that are voluntary in nature will not trigger the URA if the acquiring 
agency does not have “recourse to the power of eminent domain.”  Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Pro-
grams, 70 Fed. Reg. at 595–96.  Thus, the voluntariness principle applies to both the 
direct federal acquisitions and acquisitions by federally funded programs. 
 131 Compare § 24.101(b) (2005) with § 24.101(a)(1) (1989). 
 132 See 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(b) (2005). 
SIMUNOVICH_FINAL 1/14/2008  9:01:25 AM 
2008] COMMENT 347 
 
displacees are not precluded from receiving URA displacement bene-
fits simply because the Road Home is not vested with the power of 
eminent domain. 
B. A Narrowly Construed Eminent Domain Provision Manifestly 
Contradicts the Unambiguous Intent of the URA 
If the reference to eminent domain is interpreted narrowly—
that is, if it is interpreted to require the presence of the eminent do-
main power to trigger Subpart B benefits—it would impermissibly 
narrow the scope and application of the URA and would conse-
quently be without the weight of law.  Assuming a reviewing court de-
termines that Congress did not clearly express its intent to apply the 
voluntariness test, the FHA’s regulations would be examined for rea-
sonableness.133   
Congress expressly authorized the FHA to promulgate regula-
tions to administer the URA.134  These regulations are entitled to 
“controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary” to the statute.135  Regulations do not carry the force of law if 
they are irreconcilable with the “clear meaning of the statute, as re-
vealed by its language, purpose, and history.”136  While “considerable 
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,”137 deference to an 
agency’s policy expertise does not merit granting carte blanche au-
thority to promulgate regulations that contradict congressional in-
tent.  
Under Chevron, courts first ask whether there is clear congres-
sional intent respecting the issue at hand, and if not, whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the underlying statute is reasonable.138  As 
discussed below, the statutory scheme and legislative history of the 
URA clearly and unequivocally expresses congressional intent to 
avoid any mechanistic, dispositive eminent domain requirement. 
 133 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 134 42 U.S.C. § 4604(b)(1) (2000). 
 135 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring reversal of 
agency action determined by a court to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
 136 Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979); see also Finkler v. Elsinore 
Shore Assocs., 781 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (D.N.J. 1992). 
 137 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
 138 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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The 1987 Amendments significantly expounded upon the ex-
press declaration of policy accompanying the URA.139  As amended, 
the statute calls for “fair, uniform, and equitable treatment of all af-
fected persons,”140 and reaffirms a specific commitment to improving 
the “housing conditions of economically disadvantaged persons.”141  
In explaining the language behind the amended language, Senator 
David Durenberger, a co-sponsor of the 1987 Amendments, ex-
plained that the declaration of policy establishes that a URA trigger-
ing event can arise outside of traditional property acquisitions.142  
Moreover, it was intended that “uniformity should be subordinate to 
the need for flexibility in administering the URA.”143  In addition to 
promoting principles of administrative flexibility, the 1987 Amend-
ments were designed to “broaden the applicability of the act to in-
clude persons not . . . eligible for assistance” under the 1971 provi-
sions.144  The Federal Register is replete with statements by the FHA 
recognizing the URA’s mandate for flexibility over uniformity, and 
fact-intensive inquiries into voluntariness rather than a cursory emi-
nent domain litmus test.145   
The enumeration of federal and state agencies required to com-
ply with the URA (“covered entities”) was also amended in 1987.  Spe-
cifically, the 1987 Amendments amended the definition of covered 
entities to include those vested with the power of eminent domain.146  
The fact that the eminent domain provision was added to the list of 
covered entities is significant.  Proposed versions of the amended lan-
guage—which were never passed by Congress—called for replacing 
the description of covered entities with a simple, but markedly less 
flexible, definition of a covered entity to include only those entities 
 139 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976). 
 140 42 U.S.C. § 4621(a)(2) (2000). 
 141 Id. § 4621(c)(3).  See also 133 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Durenberger) (“Of particular concern to the committee are those eco-
nomically disadvantaged who are least able to afford suitable replacement housing 
and who are involuntarily displaced.”). 
 142 See Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1985, S. 249, 99th Cong., as re-
printed in 131 CONG. REC. S495 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985). 
 143 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 98-71 (1983), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily 
ed. Feb. 3, 1987) (“The committee’s revisions are largely intended to establish the 
conditions under which regulatory flexibility is preferable to uniformity.”). 
 144 S. REP. NO. 98-71 (1983), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 
1987). 
 145 See supra Part III.A. 
 146 42 U.S.C. § 4601(1), (3). 
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vested with the power of eminent domain.147  In adopting the more 
flexible language, Congress rejected the notion that URA benefits 
could be triggered only by an entity vested with the power of eminent 
domain.  Moreover, in a report on the proposed amendments, the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs explained that “acquisi-
tion of property under eminent domain, or the threat thereof, is not 
the only cause of the permanent and involuntary displacement of a 
person.”148   
If the eminent domain provision in the 1989 regulations is in-
terpreted narrowly—as dispositive rather than merely probative—
then the statutory framework and legislative history outlined above 
demonstrates that the narrowed interpretation manifestly contradicts 
clear and unambiguous congressional intent and should not be ac-
corded the weight of law.149  Despite unambiguous statutory lan-
guage,150 and contrary to legislative intent,151 the regulatory eminent 
domain provision improperly exalts uniformity over Congress’s ex-
press desire for administrative flexibility.  As described above, the 
1987 Amendments were intended to broaden the class of people pro-
tected by the URA, and it was expressly noted that displacement 
benefits could be triggered absent the exercise of the eminent domain 
power.152   If interpreted narrowly, however, the regulations promul-
gated in 1989 would significantly curtail URA benefits so as to apply 
only to the exceptional class of displaced residents who are forced to 
relocate because of traditional eminent domain takings.  Conse-
quently, the putative regulatory requirement of eminent domain au-
thority to trigger Subpart B benefits should not be accorded the 
weight of law since the regulations manifestly contradict the statutory 
framework and legislative intent informing the URA. 
 147 Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1985, S. 249, 99th Cong., as reprinted 
in 131 CONG. REC. S10669 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985). 
 148 S. REP. NO. 98-71 (1983), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S1561 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 
1987). 
 149 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 150 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4621(a)(1) (recognizing that a person may be displaced by 
a number of activities, only one of which is acquisition). 
 151 See supra notes 117–22, 142–48 and accompanying text. 
 152 See supra notes 117, 119, 122, 148, and accompanying text. 
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C. Assuming a Narrow Construction of the Eminent Domain 
Provision, the Buyout-Only Provision is a URA Triggering Event 
Under a Theory of Functional Takings 
Under a narrow interpretation of the eminent domain provision, 
and assuming the regulations are accorded the weight of law, the 
Road Home buyout-only provision nevertheless triggers URA dis-
placement benefits.  The buyout-only provision amounts to a “func-
tional taking” of property under the URA.  There are two hurdles 
that a viable cause of action under the URA must clear on its way to 
judicial recognition under this approach: the policy of constructive 
occupancy, and the theory of “functional takings.”153
1. Constructive Occupancy 
The URA mandates that a displaced person occupy the acquired 
residence for 180 days prior to acquisition to be eligible for reloca-
tion benefits.154  This threshold requirement would preclude URA 
benefits where an individual lives in one home, and a qualified 
 153 It should be noted as an initial matter that the theory of “functional takings” as 
applied in this Comment does not assume the same scope as it would in the eminent 
domain context.  The standard for a URA-triggering event is not an eminent domain 
taking but is instead reviewed for a more flexible, equitable standard of voluntari-
ness.  It is in this context that “functional taking” as used in this Comment should be 
interpreted.  The term should not be confused with the scholarly use of the term as a 
reference to certain regulatory takings.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and 
Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 304 (1992) (describing “regulations that 
are functionally equivalent to government acquisitions” as takings); Christopher L. 
Harris & Daniel J. Lowenberg, Recent Developments: Kelo v. City of New London, Tu-
lare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, and Washoe County v. United 
States: A Fifth Amendment Primer, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 669, 687 (2005) (referring to “the 
functional equivalent to a physical taking” in describing the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)); Barbara White, Coase and 
the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577 (1987) (describing the 
application of the Coase Theorem as resulting in a “functional equivalent of taking 
of private property without compensation” in certain instances). 
     Furthermore, functional takings for purposes of the URA is substantively different 
than a constructive taking in the eminent domain context, although similar argu-
ments can be made for both doctrines.  Constructive takings arise when a condemn-
ing authority engages in a course of unconstitutional conduct intended to force 
homeowners to sell property to the government at depressed values.  See, e.g., Amen 
v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794–96 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that city govern-
ment engaged in conduct amounting to a constructive taking of property when the 
city, inter alia, manipulated permits to limit homeowner renovations, indicated com-
pensation would be reduced the longer homeowners waited to sell their property, 
and repeatedly informed the residents that their property was subject to condemna-
tion).  A functional taking for purposes of the URA need not meet the more rigid 
requirements of eminent domain takings; rather, it must only be evident that the 
conveyance was not voluntary.  See supra Part II. 
 154 42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1). 
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agency acquires a property upon which the individual was construct-
ing a second home with the intention that it would ultimately be his 
primary residence.155  Alternatively, URA benefits would not be trig-
gered if an individual’s completed second home is involuntarily con-
veyed to an acquiring agency if the acquired home is not intended to 
be a primary residence.156
The plain language of the 180-day requirement might appear to 
preclude the recovery of URA benefits by Katrina displacees.  The ar-
gument would likely be made that (1) Road Home displacement 
benefits are unwarranted in cases where property owners did not oc-
cupy their homes for the required 180-day period prior to acquisi-
tion, and (2) even if the 180-day requirement is satisfied or over-
looked, it was a natural disaster, not a federally financed acquisition, 
that forced residents out of their homes.  Neither contention holds 
water. 
State and federal acquiring agencies argued the validity of the 
constructive occupancy policy before a number of courts,157 despite 
the fact that it is not codified in any provision of the URA or its regu-
lations.158  The doctrine was first recognized in Seeherman v. Lynn, a 
case in which residents of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania were displaced 
by Hurricane Agnes and whose properties were subsequently ac-
quired by a federally funded redevelopment authority.159  In Seeher-
man, the court found that the theory of constructive occupancy “pro-
vided that all owners of property . . . who occupied their homes on 
the day prior to [a natural disaster] would be eligible to receive relo-
cation assistance.”160   
The origin of the constructive occupancy policy is unclear but 
has not been refuted since Seeherman was decided in 1975.  The See-
herman court noted that the policy may be attributable to the Disaster 
Relief Act of 1970, mandating that relocation benefits may not be 
 155 Seeherman v. Lynn, 404 F. Supp. 1318, 1319–20 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
 156 See Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency, 432 F. Supp. 564, 565–67 (S.D. Tex. 
1977) (by implication).  The court in Ledesma also found it relevant that the home-
owners in question, who were deemed to have a case strong enough to survive the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, were forced to live in a second home be-
cause of economic hardship.  Id. at 565.  Consequently, the court found that under 
the policy of constructive occupancy, the homeowners were not precluded from re-
ceiving displacement benefits under the URA even though they were not residing in 
the acquired home at the time of acquisition.  Id. at 567. 
 157 See generally Nagi v. United States, 751 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1985); Ledesma, 
432 F. Supp. at 567; Seeherman, 404 F. Supp. at 1321–22. 
 158 Seeherman, 404 F. Supp. at 1320 n.1. 
 159 Id. at 1319–20. 
 160 Id. at 1320. 
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withheld if an otherwise eligible homeowner is denied benefits be-
cause she was prevented from reestablishing occupancy due to a pre-
sidentially declared disaster.161  The court offered this perspective de-
spite the fact that the provision in question applied only to the URA’s 
predecessor, not to the URA itself.162  Two years after Seeherman, a dis-
trict court in Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency offered a more persua-
sive analysis of the origin of the constructive occupancy policy.163  The 
court presumed that the policy originated with the URA’s require-
ment that residents displaced by a federally funded program receive 
fair and equitable treatment.164  The court relied on information in 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) 
Relocation Handbook, which articulated the constructive occupancy 
policy as a means of mitigating what might otherwise be inequitable 
results from the strict application of the URA’s statutory and regula-
tory provisions.165   
2. Actual Displacement Through Functional Takings 
The second and admittedly more complicated hurdle to judicial 
recognition of a URA-based cause of action is the theory of “func-
tional takings.”  As explained above, Road Home rehabilitation fund-
ing is not available to residents residing “in an area where a high 
proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest” in their 
homes.166  City officials publicly claimed that no communities would 
be targeted for planned elimination; however, the choice may yet be 
forced on them as funding shortages continue to plague redevelop-
ment efforts.167  Moreover, the provision’s pernicious effects were felt 
in the months immediately following the storm, and will have the 
same effect on economically disadvantaged homeowners regardless of 
whether the buyout-only restriction is actually implemented.168
The “functional takings” theory is based on the principle that 
“[a]cceptance of decision-making power requires acceptance of the 
 161 Id. at 1322 n.5 (citing Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4484 (1970)). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency, 432 F. Supp. 564, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1977). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 567 n.1. 
 166 LRA, ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 39, at 6–7. 
 167 Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1 (describing funding shortages in the Road Home 
as well as a complete absence of funding for the city’s own billion-dollar redevelop-
ment plan). 
 168 See supra note 41. 
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responsibility for the predictable effects of that power.”169  The dis-
placement of New Orleans residents is both a planned and predict-
able effect of the Road Home buyout-only provision.170  The program 
provides homeowners with a means of selling property to the state so 
the property owner can move out of a neighborhood or the state en-
tirely.  Additionally, the ambiguities surrounding the administration 
of the Road Home serve to reinforce displacement.171  A Rand Corpo-
ration172 study, conducted in response to Gulf Coast redevelopment, 
explained that 
[i]ndividual and collective decisions about how to proceed with 
reconstruction in the affected areas of the Gulf Coast are inter-
connected in complex ways, sometimes referred to in shorthand 
as the “chicken and egg” problem.  Uncertainty about the future 
level of protection will temper or tip investments and the re-
build/relocate decisions that ultimately shape the scope of recon-
struction.173
Thus, the uncertainty about the potential benefits extended to re-
turning homeowners in the months following Katrina created a disin-
centive to return and invest financial resources and sweat equity in 
rebuilding storm-damaged homes.174  In turn, this disincentive com-
pounded the uncertainty besetting residents and policy makers in de-
termining which communities could ultimately thrive in post-Katrina 
New Orleans.175  Indeed, no greater uncertainty could exist than the 
combination of the Road Home’s cryptic admission that it had not 
determined how to identify neighborhoods where too few homeown-
 169 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspec-
tive, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333, 362 (1984). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1 (noting that as of July 1, 2007—nearly two years 
after Katrina made landfall—only twenty percent of eligible homeowners who ap-
plied for Road Home funding received checks). 
 172 Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).  “The 
Rand Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision-
making through research and analysis.”  Id. at http://www.rand.org/about/. 
 173 KAHAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 39. 
 174 Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1. 
 175 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that homeowners who have returned must 
navigate through a cripplingly slow bureaucracy in order to receive the promised re-
covery assistance.  James Varney, What a Drag, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 
27, 2006, at 1.  Displaced residents who visited the Orleans Parish Mortgage Convey-
ance Office for necessary paperwork found that they needed to wait two days to 
speak with a representative.  Id.  The problem facing the residents, and the convey-
ance office, is largely one of supply and demand.  The supply of experienced em-
ployees has dwindled, yet the demand for the services has grown exponentially.  Id. 
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ers were choosing to reinvest and its cripplingly slow delivery of fed-
eral funding. 
Areas in which “too few homeowners are choosing” to reinvest 
will likely be the areas where residents have the least disposable in-
come to devote to post-storm rehabilitation and were least able to af-
ford homeowners insurance prior to the flooding.176  In a 1979 re-
port, HUD recognized that the effects of displacement are 
particularly disruptive to families with lower incomes.177  Thus, it is 
necessary to consider the socioeconomic status of the displaced resi-
dents.178
Based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the residents of the 
Lower Ninth Ward can undoubtedly be characterized as a “socially 
vulnerable population.”179  Nearly ninety percent of the population is 
African American and more than one-third of the residents do not 
have a high school degree.180  The median household income in 1999 
was less than half of the national average,181 median family income 
was sixty percent lower than the national average,182 and nearly four 
 176 Salsich, Jr., supra note 169, at 335 n.8. 
Displacement disproportionately affects socially vulnerable popula-
tions: minorities, low-income households, female-headed households 
and renters.  Each of these groups has particular attributes that con-
tribute substantially to the inability of displaced persons to find hous-
ing under the “filtering” concept.  First, minorities often are barred 
from access to many submarkets through discrimination.  Low income 
households are limited to certain markets purely by cost.  Female-
headed households are almost low-income by definition; 33% of them 
fall below the poverty line.  A report of the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights states that in 1981 the poverty rate for persons in black, 
female-headed households was 68%. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Indeed, nearly two years after the storm, New Or-
leans’s poorest neighborhoods remain largely abandoned.  Nossiter, supra note 59, at 
1. 
 177 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DISPLACEMENT REPORT 24 (1979). 
 178 Salsich, Jr., supra note 169, at 335 n.9 (“The impact of any forced move is cor-
relative to income levels.”) 
 179 Id. at 335 n.8. 
 180 U.S. Census Bureau, Zip Code Tabulation Area 70117, http://factfinder. 
census.gov (enter zip code “70112” under “Get a fact sheet for your community”).  
The percentage of Ninth Ward residents with high school degrees is 61.7%, while the 
national average is more than eighty percent.  Id. 
 181 Id.  The median income of Ninth Ward residents is $19,567 and the national 
average is $41,994.  Id.  This is also one third lower than the median income of Lou-
isiana residents, which was $32,566 in 2000.  U.S. Census Bureau, Louisiana Census 
2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, http://factfinder.census.gov (select “Louisi-
ana” under “Get a fact sheet for your community”; click the “2000” tab). 
 182 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 180.  The median family income in the Ninth 
Ward is $21,721, compared to the national median family income of $50,046.  Id. 
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times as many families lived in poverty than in the nation as a 
whole.183  However, despite the dismal economic statistics, a high per-
centage of Ninth Ward residents are homeowners compared to the 
national average.184  Acknowledging that residents of the Ninth Ward 
are generally not as wealthy as their state and national counterparts is 
not meant to suggest that any federal program that creates incentives 
for a state buyout of property triggers the URA if the sellers are of 
limited financial means.  Rather, this is meant to reinforce the ex-
press purpose of the URA to consider the unique circumstances of 
those affected by federally financed redevelopment efforts.185
The theory of “functional takings” is consistent with the purpose 
of the URA.  It recognizes the reality of the Road Home buyout-only 
provision—specifically, that a state buyout is the only rational option 
for displaced homeowners of limited financial means.  This category 
of property transfers to the Road Home cannot be characterized as a 
voluntary conveyance falling outside the protection of the URA.186
As explained above, homeowners will have the opportunity to 
self-finance the renovation of their homes.187  Considering the low 
median income, high percentage of homeowners who own their 
homes, and the complete and utter devastation of the homes in the 
Ninth Ward, this “alternative” will likely be entirely unrealistic for a 
substantial portion of Ninth Ward residents.188
Alternatively, homeowners will have the option to sell their 
homes on the open market.189  This option clearly assumes that there 
is something left to sell.  However, the wall of water that rushed into 
the Ninth Ward completely destroyed homes in the immediate vicin-
ity of the levee breach, removed others from their foundations, and 
 183 Id.  Of the families in the Ninth Ward, 34.0% lived below the poverty line in 
2000, compared with only 9.2% for the nation as a whole.  Id. 
 184 The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Lower Ninth Ward 
Neighborhood: Housing & Housing Costs, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/22/ 
housing.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).  The Greater New Orleans Community 
Data Center reports that as of the year 2000 (most recent data available), fifty-nine 
percent of Lower Ninth Ward residents owned and occupied their homes, compared 
to 66.2% for the nation as a whole.  Id. 
 185 42 U.S.C. § 4621(c)(2) (2000). 
 186 See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
 187 LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 8. 
 188 The Census statistics reveal low household wealth, indicating the difficulty 
Ninth Ward residents would likely have in financing renovations by using their sav-
ings.  Moreover, the increase in monthly recurring costs will likely preclude poorer 
homeowners from financing the renovation over a long period of time. 
 189 LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 4. 
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submerged everything else in fourteen feet of water.190  As a result of 
this complete devastation, this subset of homeowners will likely re-
ceive nothing more than the value of the land on which their homes 
were formerly located if they were to sell on the open market.  As 
with the self-financing option, the open-market sale “alternative” 
hardly presents homeowners with even the semblance of choice.  This 
distressing reality leads to one ineluctable outcome for affected 
homeowners: sell to the state at a pre-storm fair market value.  Con-
sequently, certain Road Home acquisitions should properly be con-
sidered “functional takings” for purposes of the URA, thereby moving 
the property conveyance away from the realm of voluntariness and 
triggering URA displacement benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Some may argue that compelling URA benefits punishes the 
Road Home for its generosity as the program essentially gives quali-
fied residents free retroactive flood insurance.  This argument carries 
at least superficial appeal.  However, a court must examine the prac-
tical effect, logical coherence, and statutory framework governing 
post-disaster redevelopment.191  First, if Road Home administrators 
ultimately categorize certain neighborhoods as buyout-only, it will be 
an express attempt to further the broader public weal to the detri-
ment of those homeowners who would otherwise benefit from the 
redevelopment program.  Second, widespread displacement was ag-
gravated by the ambiguities created by Road Home administrators.  
Specifically, program administrators (1) failed to determine which 
neighborhoods, if any, would be affected by the buyout-only restric-
tion, (2) failed to articulate guidelines quickly and clearly so residents 
could choose to rebuild or relocate, and (3) failed to promptly distrib-
ute grant monies to qualified homeowners. 
There is a natural predilection to rebuild what once was, yet dif-
ficult and politically unpalatable choices must be made if the realities 
facing the Gulf Coast are to be honestly and compassionately con-
fronted.192  The people of New Orleans have suffered tremendously 
since the summer of 2005, and while the devastation wrought by Hur-
ricane Katrina, exacerbated by governmental failures at every level, 
caused billions of dollars in damage and took the lives of 1500 indi-
 190 VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 84. 
 191 Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
424–34 (1989). 
 192 KAHAN ET AL., supra note 23, at xiii. 
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viduals, reason for optimism remains.  Residents, community groups, 
and policy makers have a uniquely powerful and dynamic charge—
rebuild a great city.  In so doing, three principles must guide the ef-
fort: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. 
Effective redevelopment hinges on whether city, state, and fed-
eral officials forthrightly confront the confluence of disappearing 
wetlands, land subsidence, and an inadequate levee system.  Efficient 
redevelopment relies on vesting city planners and policy makers with 
both the discretion and the leadership to concentrate redevelopment 
in order to facilitate the provision of critical infrastructure and city 
services.  A smaller city, at least in the short term, may be a necessary 
evil brought about by the reality of permanent and semi-permanent 
displacement, which in turn places severe constraints on city services. 
Equally important is that redevelopment efforts be guided by 
principles of equity and comply with the uniform federal displace-
ment policy.  After Katrina, a smaller New Orleans serves the public 
welfare, a reality acknowledged in the Road Home’s buyout-only pro-
vision, and the affected residents should not be forced to “suffer dis-
proportionate injuries as a result” of the planned redevelopment.193  
Moreover, the “choices” the Road Home provides certain homeown-
ers ultimately leads to a single inescapable outcome, thereby remov-
ing the critical element of voluntariness from buyout-only acquisi-
tions.  Implementing the status-preserving principles embodied in 
the URA can potentially transform the Road Home from the single 
largest housing recovery program to one that is also effective, effi-
cient, and equitable. 
In the end, however, the scope of this Comment is broader than 
either Hurricane Katrina or the Road Home.  Both are offered and 
analyzed here as templates of future disasters and corresponding re-
covery efforts.  It is crucial that government officials, community 
groups, practitioners, and the general public understand the scope 
and application of the URA.  The element of voluntariness embed-
ded within the URA’s statutory and regulatory framework can rede-
fine future post-disaster redevelopment efforts, and provide govern-
ment officials the flexibility to offer unique and resource-efficient 
recovery plans while simultaneously protecting the homeowner status 
of displaced residents. 
 193 42 U.S.C. § 4621(b) (2000). 
